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Cryptographic protocols that are established as secure in the Universally Com-
posable (UC) model of security provide strong security assurances even when run
in complex environments. Unfortunately, in order to achieve such strong security
properties, UC protocols are often impractical, and most non-trivial two-party pro-
tocols cannot be secure in the UC model without some sort of external capability
(or "setup assumption") being introduced. Recent work by Hofheinz et al. [18] pro-
vided an important breakthrough in designing realistic universally composable two
party protocols, in which they use trusted, tamper proof hardware as a special type
of helping functionality which they call a catalyst. Hofheinz et al. use government
issued signature cards as a catalyst to design universally composable protocols for
zero-knowledge proofs and commitments, but did not give a complete security proof
for either protocol.
In this thesis, we consider another form of security hardware, Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs), which are more widespread than signature cards and are currently
shipped as a part of almost every business laptop or desktop. Trusted Module Plat-
forms are tamper evident devices which support cryptographic functionalities includ-
ing digital signatures, but have a dierent key management model from signature
cards. In this thesis we consider TPMs as catalysts and describe a universally com-
posable zero knowledge protocol using Trusted Platform Modules. We also present a
complete security proof for both the Hofheinz's universally composable zero knowl-
edge protocol from signature cards and our universally composable zero knowledge
protocol using TPMs as a catalyst.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The term cryptography is derived from the Greek phrase for hidden writing
[22]. The story of cryptography goes back thousands of years, and initially cryptog-
raphy dealt with the methods of encryption which used only pen and paper. The de-
velopment of cryptanalysis (the science of breaking secret writing) has been balanced
by the development of cryptography. The rst glimpses of modern cryptography were
seen during the phases of World War I and World War II, and over the years, the use
of cryptography has drastically increased in military applications. Until 1970's, the
domain of cryptography comprised of only encryption and decryption techniques, i.e.,
keeping messages secret in storage or transmission. Working with data in complex
environments, the protection of data may have the traditional meaning of secrecy
(condentiality) but may also include goals such as integrity, authenticity or fair-
ness, and so cryptography has expanded to cover techniques that support goals other
than secrecy. For example, the authenticity of data in a complex environment can
be addressed using digital signatures [21]. In the 1970's and 1980's breakthroughs
in computer science fundamentally changed the way cryptography was viewed. In
the 1970's, the data encryption standard (DES) [24] and public-key cryptography
[10] were introduced. The invention of the key exchange mechanism by Die and
Hellman [10] in 1976, and the rst public key encryption algorithm by Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman [21] in 1978 played a vital role in building the new idea of public key
cryptosystems. In 1984, the concept of an interactive proof system was introduced
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by Goldwasser et al. [14]. The proposed systems led to the development of new
computational models of security. Later, many additional cryptographic techniques
and concepts were introduced, including one-way functions, pseudo-random genera-
tors, zero-knowledge proofs [13] and witness indistinguishable arguments [11]. Unlike
the classical view of cryptography, which focused on only secret messages, modern
cryptography has a much expanded domain.
In this work we present a zero-knowledge protocol using Trusted Platform Mod-
ules (TPMs) to achieve universal composable security. This chapter mainly focuses
on background information, which sets a foundation for us to present our work. In
Section 1.1, we present background information on zero-knowledge proofs. The uni-
versal composable model of security is discussed in Section 1.2. We discuss protocols
related to trusted/tamper proof hardware in Section 1.3. Prior work and an overview
of our results are given in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 respectively.
1.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In 1985, Goldwasser et al.[13] introduced a new concept called zero-knowledge
proof, which is an interactive protocol between two parties, prover P and verier
V , where P 's job is to convince V that a common input x is in some language L.
For example, x might be a graph, and P needs to convince V that x contains a
Hamiltonian cycle. In a zero knowledge proof P proves to V that a statement is
true, without revealing any information other than the veracity of the statement.
Formally, P and V are probabilistic Turing machines such that at the end of this
interactive protocol, V outputs either Accept or Reject as a result. To be an
interactive proof, this protocol should have two properties: It should be complete,
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where an honest prover will always gets acceptance, and it should be sound, meaning
that no cheating prover can convince an honest verier that a false statement is true,
except with small probability.
Denition I.1. Interactive Proof System
A pair of interactive machines 〈P, V 〉 with prover P and verier V is called an interac-
tive proof system for a language L if machine V is polynomial-time and the following
two conditions hold:
Completeness: For every x ∈ L, Pr [〈P, V 〉(x) = 1] ≥ 2
3
Soundness: For every x /∈ L and every interactive machine B, Pr [〈B, V 〉(x) = 1] ≤ 1
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To be a zero-knowledge proof, it also should have a property called zero knowledge,
where no cheating verier learns any information other than statement to be proven.
To illustrate the zero knowledge proof concept, we consider an example with partici-
pants Alice and Bob. Consider a situation in which Alice knows a Hamiltonian cycle
C for a large graph G. She wants to prove to Bob that G has a Hamiltonian cycle,
but does not want to reveal the cycle to him. Alice posts G publicly such that both
Alice and Bob share a common input graph G. Alice creates a graph H isomorphic
to G by randomly permuting the vertices of G. She commits H but doesn't reveal H
to Bob. Lets say she writes each edge of H on a slip of paper and turns them over
so that they are visible to both of them so that Alice cannot change anything about
H at a later part of the protocol. Bob ips a coin. If heads, Alice shows how H is
isomorphic to G by turning all pieces of paper that she put on the table. If tails, Alice
shows the Hamiltonian cycle in H to Bob by just turning over just the edges in the
Hamiltonian cycle. This interactive game of Alice and Bob works accordingly with
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the above mentioned thee properties, i.e., completeness, soundness and zero knowl-
edge. In the above scenario, the Hamiltonian cycle C is secret information, sometimes
called a witness to the fact that G has a Hamiltonian cycle, and verier V does not
gain any information about the witness even at the end of the protocol.
In order to dene the security of an interactive proof protocol we have to consider
the following setting. Consider a cheating verier V ∗ interacting with P on input
x ∈ L. Since P and V ∗ are probabilistic, the output of V ∗ is a random variable for
each x ∈ L, or is an ensemble, which we denote Rx∈L (this is real output). Next,
consider creating a simulatorMV ∗ which simulates the cheating verier V
∗ with same
input x ∈ L and generates the ensemble Sx∈L. Since MV ∗ does not interact with
P , it can't discover P 's information, so if MV ∗ behaves essentially the same as V
∗
interacting with P , then V ∗ similarly can not gain information. Technically, this
holds if Rx and Sx are computationally indistinguishable which means that for every
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, for every polynomial p(.), and for all
suciently large |x|, it holds that
|Pr[D(x,Rx) = 1]− Pr[D(x, Sx) = 1]| < 1p(|x|) .
Denition I.2. Zero-knowledge Proof
Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interactive proof system for a language L. We say the proof system
〈P, V 〉 is zero knowledge if for every expected polynomial time interactive Turing
machine V ∗ , there exists an ordinary expected polynomial time machine MV ∗ such
that the probability ensembles {MV ∗(x)}x∈L and {P (x), V ∗(x)}x∈L are polynomial
indistinguishable.
The zero-knowledge property is not necessarily preserved in a scenario where mul-
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tiple zero-knowledge protocol instances are executed simultaneously (in parallel) in
the same environment [12]. To preserve the privacy in such a scenario, we consider a
notion called Witness Indistinguishable proofs. This notion was introduced in 1990
by Shamir et al. [11] as a weaker variant of zero-knowledge proofs, but is still strong
enough to be very helpful in providing security in some specic applications. In many
interactive proof scenarios, there may be witnesses that prove that x ∈ L. In our pre-
vious Hamiltonian cycle example, any Hamiltonian cycle serves as a witness. The
main idea of witness indistinguishable proof is to guarantee that the verier will not
be able to distinguish between provers that use dierent witnesses. In order to un-
derstand witness indistinguishablity, consider an example where Alice and Bob will
be participating in an interactive proof system. Alice knows more than one Hamil-
tonian cycle to a graph G, say two Hamiltonian cycles C and D. Both Alice and
Bob share graph G as common input. The goal for Alice is to convince Bob that
it has a Hamiltonian cycle for graph G. Alice interacts with Bob using one of her
Hamiltonian cycles, C or D. Bob will verify the validity of the proof but his view on
the P 's proof will be indistinguishable no matter which Hamiltonian cycle Alice uses.
Therefore, the interactive proof between Alice and Bob is witness indistinguishable
because Bob cannot tell which Hamiltonian cycle Alice uses to construct the proof.
Witness indistinguishabilty can be formally dened as follows.
Denition I.3. Witness Indistinguishable Arguments of Knowledge (WIAOK)
Let 〈P, V 〉 be an interactive proof system for a language L ∈ NP and V ∗ be a
probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine and RL be a witness relation for
a language L, i.e., if x ∈ L there exist a witness w such that xRLw. We say the
proof system 〈P, V 〉 is witness indistinguishable over RL if for any V ∗ and every two
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w1x, w
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x ∈ RL(x), the two ensembles {〈P (w1x), V ∗〉(x)}x∈L and {〈P (w2x), V ∗〉(x)}x∈L are
computationally indistinguishable. In other words, for every probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm D, every polynomial p(.) and all suciently long x ∈ L, it holds that
Pr[D(x, 〈P (w1x), V ∗〉(x) = 1]− Pr[D(x, 〈P (w2x), V ∗〉(x) = 1]| < 1p(|x|) .
In our work we assume that there exists witness indistinguishable arguments of
knowledge (WIAOK) (which is true under the standard cryptographic assumption
that one-way functions exist). WIAOK satisfy three properties. First, these argu-
ments are computationally convincing proofs, i.e., a computationally limited prover
can make the verier accept high negligible probability. Second, they are arguments
of knowledge, which means that from a prover which is giving convincing arguments
a witness can be extracted. Third, the arguments of knowledge are witness indistin-
guishable: the protocol runs are indistinguishable for dierent witnesses.
1.2 Universal Composable Framework
Imagine a complex cryptographic environment with several types of protocols like
identication protocols, key exchange protocols and several other interactive proto-
cols. Lets say each type of protocol may be executed many times and each party
in that environment may take part in several protocol executions simultaneously.
Even if individual protocols are secure in isolation, one important question to ask
is whether protocols retain security in such a complex environment. Lets say there
exists a cheating party which participates in this environment and obtains valuable
information by executing some protocols of that environment which it can use to
compute responses of other protocols of the same environment. Traditional security
denitions of cryptographic protocols treat protocols as stand-alone applications and
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are helpful for simple analysis of protocols. These security denitions do not address
security when these protocol instances are composed with other arbitrary protocol
instances. Extending denitions of security of these protocols in such an environment
is a way to address the issues with those cheating parties. Clearly, there is a need for
a model of security which can better address security in such complex environments.
In 2001, Canneti proposed a framework called Universal Composablity, which
guarantees that security dened for protocols as stand alone applications is preserved
in the composition of these protocols instances with other arbitrary protocol instances
in an unpredictable environment. A cryptographic functionality can be executed
either in an ideal world in which all operations are performed by a completely trusted
party (and hence the execution is secure), or in the real world where there is no
trusted party and the parties have to execute the protocol just amongst themselves.
The UC framework considers an algorithmic entity called the environment (observer)
which gives inputs to the participating parties of a protocol (implementing some
cryptographic task) and collects outputs from the parties of the protocol in course
of its execution. Finally, the environment produces an output bit which can be
interpreted as saying whether it thinks it has interacted with ideal functionality of a
cryptographic task or a real protocol implementing same cryptographic task. Since
the ideal world is inherently secure, if an environment cannot distinguish between
this ideal functionality and a real protocol implementing the same cryptographic
task, then that real protocol securely implements the ideal functionality, and we say
that it is universally composable.
Consider the protocol π that is executed in real world and ideal functionality F
is works in ideal world. Formally, the participants of both worlds will be interactive
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Turing machines, and we describe both worlds below.
Ideal Model: The participants in the ideal model are the environment Z, ideal
adversary S, the ideal functionality F , and dummy parties. Z can write inputs to
these dummy parties and the outputs of these parties will be given to Z. Z cannot
see the communication between the F and dummy parties. Inputs given to dummy
parties will be sent to F and anything received by F will be written to their local
outputs. S communicates with Z and F . S can corrupt parties such that it can see
all the interactions between F and corrupted parties. There are no direct interactions
between these dummy parties.
Real Model: In the real world, the protocol π will be implemented by the
parties interacting with each other. The participants of this world are environment
Z, real adversary A and participating parties. Z can write inputs to these real parties
and the outputs of these parties will be given to Z. Parties may communicate with
each other in the course of the protocol, but Z cannot see these communications
between the parties. A communicates with Z and F . A can corrupt any parties
in this protocol and A will participate in the protocol π on behalf of any corrupted
parties.
Realizing an ideal functionality: Protocol π securely realizes ideal function-
ality F if for any real-life adversary A there exists an ideal adversary S such that no
environment Z can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with
A and π in the real model or with S and F in the ideal world.
Since universally composable security is a strict notion of security, designing re-
alistic cryptographic tasks in universally composable framework need additionally
helping functionalities. In earlier works, Hofheinz and Muller-Quade [17], and Backes
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et al. [1] use helping functionalities random oracle and key registration authorities,
respectively. These functionalities are dened in such a way that if a protocol instance
implements some instance of helping functionality, then the helping functionality can-
not be used by other applications without compromising UC security.
Hofheinzet al. [18] introduce the concept of catalyst, where a catalyst is a help-
ing functionality which can be used simultaneously for dierent purposes without
compromising universal composable security. C is a catalyst for functionality F if C
can be implemented by F and the same instance C can be directly be used by other
arbitrary applications without any additional precautions. The formal denition of a
catalyst is given below.
Denition I.4. Let π be a protocol realizing the functionalities F and C using C.
We say that C is used as a catalyst if π realizes C by just relaying all requests and
the respective answers directly to and from the functionality C.
Hofheinz et al. use government issued signature cards as a catalyst in designing
zero knowledge and commitments protocols in the universally composable framework.
In our work, we use Trusted Platform Modules as a catalyst in designing a universally
composable zero knowledge protocol.
1.3 Trusted/Tamper Proof Hardware
Unfortunately, fundamental limitations result in the impossibility of using the uni-
versally composable framework directly for most two-party protocols [7]. To counter
this problem researchers have suggested adding some initial capability to the universal
composable model (technically composed into the base model) which is called a setup
assumption. A variety of setup assumptions have been made to design two party
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protocols in universally composed framework. Typical work in this area includes work
by Canneti [3], Canneti and Fischlin [5], Lindell et al. [6], and Dodis et al. [4], who
consider a setup where there exists one or more trusted parties that operate with
some pre-agreed rules for all participants of the protocol. In practice, relying on such
trusted parties is undesirable, making the design of realistic universally composable
two party protocols very dicult. More recently, the design of two party protocols
in the universally composable framework has been considered using assumptions of
tamper-proof hardware, where each participant in the protocol will have access to its
own such hardware. For example, Katz [19] proposed a physical setup assumption,
specically tamper-proof hardware tokens, which provides an interesting way to real-
ize two-party protocols in the universally composable framework. With the advent of
tamper evident hardware devices like TPMs and government issued signature cards,
the design of protocols in the universally composable framework can consider realistic
hardware assumptions. In this section, we present background information of Katz's
tamper proof hardware tokens, signature cards and TPMs.
Katz's Tamper Proof Hardware Tokens
As described above, Katz [19] was the rst to consider tamper proof hardware
tokens in designing universally composable multiple party protocols. The assump-
tions made by Katz in designing hardware tokens are as follows: First, each party
participating in a protocol can construct its own tamper proof hardware token which
implements a desired functionality. Second, when a hardware token is sent to some
cheating party, it cannot deduce any information about the token's functionality ex-
cept what it can observe from input/output behavior. Finally, when an honest party
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is given a token from a cheating party, it cannot deduce any information about the
functionality the token is implementing (it observes only outputs of the token). With
these primitives, Katz [19] designed a protocol for universally composable multi-party
commitments.
Subsequent work from Chandran et al. [8], Damgard et al. [9] improved on Katz's
physical assumptions in various ways like including a resettable feature. Moragan and
Segev [20] also improved Katz's solution by requiring only one of the participants of
the two-party protocols to create a secure token.
Signature Cards
Hofheinz et al. [18] considered the use of government issues signature cards, which
are tamper proof devices that function with globally accepted setup. Each card holds
a legitimate key pair (public key and private key) where the private key is embedded
into the card. The functionality of such cards includes generating digital signatures
for messages sent to the card. The private key of a signature card cannot be extracted
even by the legitimate owner of the card under any circumstances. Therefore, digital
signatures generated by these cards are unforgeable by anyone without access to the
card. Hofheinz et al. [18] use the cards as catalysts to design two party universally
composable zero knowledge proof and commitment protocols. As some European
governments are issuing such tamper evident signature cards, the design of realistic
universally composable protocols is feasible. Drawbacks of the use such cards includes
the fact that these signature cards are not widespread and the participants of the
protocol must completely trust the producer/issuer of these cards (which is a threat).
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Trusted Platform Modules
The Trusted Computing Group, a consortium of more than 100 companies, has
dened a specication for a security chip called a Trusted Platform Module (TPM),
which is designed to be attached to the motherboard of a computer. The functionality
of a TPM includes the secure generation of cryptographic keys, generating pseudo-
random numbers, remote attestation, sealed storage and common cryptographic op-
erations like RSA encryption, RSA digital signatures and generating hashes (SHA1).
A TPM is a tamper evident hardware device which is designed to software attacks.
Key management in TPMs is quite dierent from the signature cards described
in the previous section. Users can create dierent RSA keys for dierent purposes.
These user generated keys include bind keys, signing keys, legacy keys, storage keys
and Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs). Creating and using a key in a TPM involves
several steps. We give a rough idea of how it works below:
(1) Every user-created key is created under a parent key (which must be a storage
key).
(2) When users request creation of a key, they must specify the parent key and a user
selected secret called the authorization secret. The TPM returns a wrapped key
blob which contains newly created key (both public key and encrypted private
key, which is encrypted with the parent key). Since the private key never exists
unencrypted outside a TPM, TPMs provide secure key management.
(3) In order to use a user generated key in the TPM, it has to be loaded into TPM
so that the private key can be decrypted and used for purposes like signing (if
12
the loaded key is a signing key) or decryption (if the key is a bind key). For
loading the key, the user has to provide the authorization secret for the parent
key, which should be loaded prior to this operation. If the TPM successfully
loads the key, it returns a key handle for that key which serves as a reference
to the user for future purposes, and when it is used the user must provide the
authorization secret to the TPM.
Each TPM is shipped with a unique Endorsement Key which is embedded in it
by the TPM vendor. The validity of EK reects the validity of TPM. Using the
TPM's EK, a TPM owner can create Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs), which can
be certied by trusted certicate authorities (CAs). AIKs can certify information
coming from a TPM, including keys generated by the TPM. For detailed descriptions
of functionalities of a TPM, we refer the reader to the TCG's specications [15].
An important advantage of TPMs over other secure hardware proposals is that it
is designed as an attachment to the motherboard of the local system, and TPMs are
currently being shipped with most business-class laptops and desktops. This makes
TPM a widespread device which can be helpful in designing realistic protocols in the
universally composable framework.
1.4 Prior Work
In Section 1.3, we have discussed a number of setup assumptions, including trust
assumptions and physical assumptions, for designing universally composable secure
multiple party protocols. In this section we discuss some existing solutions and other
related work.
Canneti and Fischlin [5] introduced the use of a Common Reference String (CRS)
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model as a setup assumption in the universally composable framework. In this model,
the CRS is generated by a trusted party which functions in a pre-agreed manner set
by all parties participating in the protocol. For example, in some situations the re-
quirements of CRS are that it should be a uniformly distributed random string. In
practice, one must trust some party to honestly generate the CRS, which may not be
realistic. Public key registration services, considered in by Barak et al. [2] and Dodis
et al [4] also serve the purpose of designing multiparty protocols in universally com-
posable framework with certain setup assumptions. For example, the functionality of
Barak et al. [2] will not allow any cheating party to register its public key which is
not generated with pre-agreed rules. Clearly the drawback in this model, is that it is
dicult in practice to guarantee such a public key with the given setup assumption.
Each of the mentioned works use some trusted assumption that is unrealistic. Katz
[19] introduces a new way to design protocols in the universally composable setting by
suggesting a hardware assumption of tamper proof hardware tokens created by each
party, which eliminates the necessity of trust in a third party. In 2005, Hofheinz et
al. [18] introduced a feasible way of designing realistic zero-knowledge protocol and
commitment protocols in the universal composable setting with assumptions of gov-
ernment issued signature cards. One drawback of this approach is that parties of the
protocol must have complete trust in the producer or issuer of these signature cards
(What if the producer/issuer is corrupted?). With the advent of TPMs, the scope
of designing realistic multiple party protocols in the universal composable framework
will be wider. Prior work using TPMs to design cryptographic protocols showed
that TPMs can enable previously impossible functionality. For example, Gunupudi
and Tate [16] created instantiation of a random oracle in multi-party settings where
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each party has access to a TPM. Tate and Vishwanathan [23] used TPM capabilities
and designed alogrithms to replace cut and choose protocols in veriable encryp-
tion schemes, making the protocol non-interactive and oering more computational
eciency.
1.5 Motivations and Results Overview
The goal of this work is to consider universally composable zero knowledge using
signature cards and TPMs. We give a complete security proof for Hofheinz et al.'s
proposed universally composable zero knowledge protocols using signature cards, and
we extend this protocol to propose a universally composable zero knowledge protocol
using Trusted Platform Modules. Some motivations for this work are given below.
(1) Hofheinz et al. [18] did not give a complete security proof for their UC zero
knowledge arguments using signature cards.
(2) The parties participating in Hofheinz et al. [18] must have complete trust in
the producer or issuer of the card.
(3) The government issued signature cards are not widespread, i.e., not accessible
to many users across the world.
The results of this work are as follows. First, we redene the ideal functionality
used in Hofheinz et al. [18] by using the traditional zero-knowledge ideal functionality.
Secondly, we present a complete security proof for the universally composable zero
knowledge protocol using signature cards [18]. Extending this work to a more common
form of secure hardware, we dene the TPM-based catalyst's ideal functionality, and
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propose a universally composable zero knowledge protocol using TPMs. We also
present a complete security proof for our protocol.
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CHAPTER II
UC ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOLS
In this chapter, we propose a complete security proof for the zero-knowledge proof
based on signature cards of Hofheinz et al. [18] and present a new zero-knowledge
protocol in the universal composable model using an idealized TPM as catalyst. This
chapter contains two sections. In Section 2.1, we introduce some of the denitions
used in this work. We present protocol SC-ZKR and also a complete security proof.
In Section 2.2, we introduce functionality FTT PM, propose a protocol implementing
functionality FRZK and present a complete security proof for the TPM-based protocol.
2.1 Zero knowledge protocols based on Signature Cards
In this section, we present proof for universally composable security of the zero-
knowledge protocol based on signature cards of Hofheinz et al. [18]. We list some
notations and denitions used in rest of this work are below.
(1) k is a security parameter which controls the length of various parameters. In
all cases in which lengths are a function of k, such a n(k), m(k), and s(k), the
function is polynomial in k.
(2) w : a witness w known to prover P where w ∈ {0, 1}n(k).
(3) N: A random nonce N generated by verier V where N ∈ {0, 1}k.
(4) r: An arbitrary string r generated by a party where r ∈ {0, 1}n(k).
(5) R: A relation R is dened as an NP relation where R ⊆ {0, 1}m(k)×{0, 1}n(k).
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Recall that x ∈ {0, 1}m(k) is the common input to both parties, i.e., honest prover
P and honest verier V in zero-knowledge protocols. P knows a witness w such that
xRw. In developing their signature card assisted zero-knowledge protocols, Hofheinz
et al. used a non-standard denition of zero-knowledge functionality that required
transmitting an executable predicate to specify the relation to the ideal functionality
[18]. While this allows a single functionality to serve arbitrary relations, it suers
from complications due to treating a relation as a transmittable parameter. In this
thesis, we return to the traditional denitions of zero knowledge functionality in which
the functionality is parametrized by the relation. The following denition is based on
the original zero knowledge functionality dened by Goldwasser et al. [13]. The ideal
functionality FRZK with relation R is dened as follows
Denition II.1. FRZK
Functionality FRZK
FRZK proceeds as follows, running with a prover P , verier V , and an adversary S.
Upon receipt of an input (prove,sid,x,w) with xRw from party P , send (prove, sid, x)
to S. As soon as S allows the delivery, send (proven, sid, x) to V where sid is the
session id that is commonly used in universally composable denitions to distin-
guish between multiple uses of the same functionality.
Hofheinz's signature card based catalyst functionality FGSigCard is given below.
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Functionality FGSigCard (from [18])
For a signature scheme G, FGSigCard proceeds as follows, running with parties P1,...,Pn
and an adversary S.
Initialization: For each party Pi, generate a public/secret key (pki, ski) and set
possessori :=⊥.
Get public key: When receiving a message (getkey, sid, j) from some sub party
P , send the public key pkj to P . Before delivering the key, ask the adversary (non-
immediate delivery).
Signature Generation: Upon receiving a message (sign, sid,m) from some sub-
party P of Pi, if P = possessori, generate a signature σ using ski, store the tuple
(i,m, σ), and send (signature, sid,m, σ) to Pi.
Signature Verication: Upon receiving a message (verify, sid, Pi,m, σ) from Pj
do: If a tuple (i,m, σ) is a stored set f = 1 else set f = 0. Then if the public
key of Pi was already delivered to Pj in some prior Get public key step, send
(verified, sid,m, f) to Pj.
Possession: Upon receiving a message (seize, sid) from subparty P (where P is
a subparty of Pi or P = S), if possessori :=⊥, set possessori := P and send
(seized, sid) to subparty P . Otherwise send (occupied, sid) to subparty P .
Dispossession:Upon receiving a message (release, sid) from subparty P (where P
is a subparty of Pi of P = S), if possessori := P , set possessori :=⊥.
The functionalities of the ideal functionality FGSigCard include generating signa-
tures. We list denitions of some signatures generated by FGSigCard and some related
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notations which are used in rest of this work here.
Denition II.2. Signatures by Signature Cards
(1) sN : Signature generated by FGSigCard functionality of verier V on a random
string N where sN ∈ {0, 1}s(k).
(2) sw: Signature generated by FGSigCard functionality of prover P on a witness w
where sw ∈ {0, 1}s(k).
(3) sR: An arbitrary string generated by a party with length same as the signature
generated by FGSigCard where sR ∈ {0, 1}
s(k).
Protocol SC-ZKR
We present the protocol SC-ZKR of Hofheinz et al.[18], with modied notations
which reect the use of the traditional zero knowledge functionality. Participants in
protocol SC-ZKR are prover P , verier V , real adversary A, ideal simulator S and
the environment Z. All communication is done through a secure channel that only
leaks the length of the messages. Z may access the functionality FGSigCard through
parties other than P and V . P knows (x,w) such that xRw.
(1) When receiving an input (prove, sid, x, w), where x is the common input for R
such that xRw, P sends x ∈ {0, 1}m(k) to V .
(2) V seizes its signature card. If it cannot seize the card, it terminates.
(3) V generates a random nonce N of k bits. This nonce is sent via a secure channel
to P .
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(4) P requests the public keys pkV and pkP of V and P , respectively, from FGSigCard.
Then it seizes its signature card, signs w and releases its signature card. Next, it
proves to the V that it knows a triple (w, sw, sR) such that verifypkP (1
k, sw,w)∧
xRw∨ verifypkV (1
k, sR, N) using a witness indistinguishable argument of knowl-
edge (WIAOK).
(5) If V accepts the argument of knowledge, it terminates with output (proven, sid, x).
Additionally, it releases its signature card in any case.
Theorem II.3. If G is an existentially unforgeable signature scheme, then protocol
SC-ZKR using the functionality FGSigCard securely implements the functionalities FRZK
and FGSigCard with respect to static adversaries. Here F
G
SigCard is used as a catalyst.
Proof. In order to prove the security of SC-ZKR, we consider two scenarios of imple-
menting protocol SC-ZKR, one with V corrupted and the other with P corrupted.
In both cases we consider two settings: one in which the real protocol runs with real
parties, and another with a simulator S interacting with ideal functionality FRZK . At
the nish of either setting, the environment provides an output Z(ensemble), which
is a random variable (i.e., the output of Z on input ensemble).
Case 1 : Corrupted Verier
Two setting are described below.
Real adversary A
As the verier V is corrupted, the protocol SC-ZKR will be modied. Adversary
A takes control of the corrupted verier V and stands in for V in SC-ZKR. Step 3
of the above protocol SC-ZKR will be modied where A will generate nonce N of
k bits and send it to the P . And, step 5 also be modied, as A will be responding
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to the P 's WIAOK and delivering the output to the environment Z. After step 3 of
SC-ZKR, both parties will have same input I = 〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k) × {0, 1}k. The
witness triple for the WIAOK will beWA = (w, sw, sR), and as honest prover P knows
the witness w and its signature sw, it will generate WIAOK for verifypkp(1
k, sw,w) ∧
xRw∨ verifypkv(1k, sR, N). The ensemble generated by A, on interaction with honest
P with witness WA on common input I is {〈P (WA),A〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k .
Ideal adversary S
As the verier is corrupted, simulator S simulates the static adversary A with
real parties, i.e., with honest prover P and corrupted verier V . When the FRZK
receives (prove,sid,x,w) from party P , and if xRw, then FRZK sends (prove,sid, x ) to
S. Note that while P knows w, simulator S is unaware of w inorder to prove xRw.
As soon as S receives (prove,sid, x ) it seizes V 's signature card and simulates real
adversary A with real corrupted verier V from step 3 of protocol SC-ZKR. After
the simulation of A produces nonce N , S sends N to V 's signature card and receives
sN from V 's signature card. Next, S sets up a WIAOK using the common input
I = 〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k)×{0, 1}k and witness triple WS = (r, sR, sN), and the WIAOK
will argue that verifypkp(1
k, sR, r)∧xRw∨verifypkv(1k, sN , N). The ensemble generated
by S in this case will be {〈S(WS),S〉(I)}I:{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k .
In the two settings, real and ideal, the behavior seen by the environment Z is iden-
tical through step 3 of SC-ZKR. The only dierence is in the WIAOK in step 4 and
step 5, so in eect environment Z acts as a polynomial-time distinguisher for the real
and ideal settings. If Z can distinguish between the real world adversary A and ideal
adversary S with non negligible probability 1
p(k)
, then the above construction acts as
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a distinguisher for the WIAOK witnessesWA andWS with non-negligible probability,
violating our assumption of secure WIAOK. Therefore, it follows for any polynomial
p(k) and all suciently large k it holds
Pr[Z(I, 〈P (WA),A〉(I)) = 1]− Pr[Z(I, 〈P (WS),S〉(I)) = 1] < 1p(k) .
Case 2: Corrupted Prover
We consider two settings, i.e., real adversary A interacting with SC-ZKR and ideal
adversary S interacting with FRZK. In both settings, an honest V will be participating.
The sequence of steps of V 's interaction with SC-ZKR plays a vital role in the proof.
V seizes its signature card (in step 2) and then generates a random nonce N . V
releases its signature only at the end of SC-ZKR (step 5). This prevents any other
party from seizing V 's signature card in the course of SC-ZKR (step 2 through step
5) to generate a fake signature sN for nonce N and generate the WIAOK.
Real Adversary A
As prover P is corrupted, adversary A takes control of prover P which leads to
the modication of SC-ZKR. Step 1 of SC-ZKR will be modied, where A sends
x ∈ {0, 1}m(k) on behalf of P . Step 4 of SC-ZKR will be modied, where A will prove
to the verier that there exists a triple (w, sw, sR) such that verifypkP (1
k, sw,w) ∧
xRw ∨ verifypkV (1
k, sR, N) using a WIAOK. After step 3 of modied protocol SC-
ZKR, both parties adversary A and honest verier V will have the same input I =
〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k) × {0, 1}k The witness triple in this case is WA = (w, sw, sR) and
WIAOK is verifypkp(1
k, sw,w) ∧ xRw ∨ verifypkv(1k, sR, N). The ensemble generated
by honest V , on interaction with corrupted P with witness WA on common input I
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is {〈A(WA), V 〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k
Ideal Adversary S
As prover P is corrupted, simulator S simulates the static adversary A with
real parties, i.e., corrupted prover P and honest verier V . As a part of simulation
of the real protocol SC-ZKR with static adversary A, step 1 of TPM-ZKR will be
modied where A stands in for corrupted P . In step 1, A will send x ∈ {0, 1}m(k)
to honest verier V . Step 4 will be modied where S seizes corrupted P 's signature
card and A sends w to S to get sw. Since the signature card is a catalyst, A may
send many other values to S (which seized P 's signature cards) for signatures of
those values. In order to capture w, S tests every value from A to see which value
w satises xRw and then stores both w and sw. After generating sw, S delivers
sw to A and releases P 's signature card. In the ideal world, S acts as corrupted P
and sends (prove, sid, x, w) to ideal functionality FRZK . Since xRw, then FRZK sends
(prove, sid, x) to S. Another modication for step 4 is A will prove to the honest
verier V of FRZK that there exists a triple (w, sw, sR) such that verifypkp(1k, sw,w) ∧
xRw ∨ verifypkv(1k, sR, N) using a WIAOK. Depending on real honest verier V 's
output at step 5, the simulator S either allows or does not allow the ideal functionality
FRZK to send (proven,sid,x ) to ideal party V . Since simulator S simulates the complete
modied protocol SC-ZKR with static adversary A, the ensemble generated by the
real honest verier is {〈A(WA), V 〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k , where I is the common input.
Finally, the environment Z cannot distinguish with which adversary it is interacting,
because in both scenarios the honest verier produces indistinguishable ensembles.
Therefore, from both cases we have shown that protocol SC-ZKR using the func-
tionality FGSigCard securely implements the functionalities FRZK and F
G
SigCard with re-
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spect to static adversaries.
2.2 Zero-knowledge protocols based on TPMs
In this section, we propose a zero-knowledge protocol in the universal composable
model of security, using a tamper proof device called a Trusted Platform Module as a
catalyst. As described earlier in this chapter, Hofheinz et al.[18] use signature cards
as catalysts in designing both zero-knowledge proofs and commitments in universal
composable settings. In this section we use Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) as a
catalyst in designing a zero-knowledge protocol with universally composable security.
FTTPM
The catalyst functionality in this protocol is FTTPM , which we given below
Functionality FTTPM
Part I
For a signature scheme T , FTTPM proceeds as follows,running with parties
P1,...,Pn and an adversary S.
Initialization: For each party Pi, a TPMi with a legitimate Endorsement
Key (EK) is given.
Create AIK: When receiving a message (creataik, sid) from some sub party
P of Pi, creates an Attestation Identity Key AIKi, generates certicate
certAIKi from Trusted CA using makeidentity functionality, stores a tuple
(sid, i, AIKi, certAIKi) and returns (pubAIKi , certAIKi , sid) to Pi.
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Functionality FTTPM
Part II
Create Key: When receiving a message (createkey, sid, secret) from some
sub party P of Pi, creates a signing key keyi. If there exists a stored tuple
(sid, i, AIKi, certAIKi), then generate certicate certkeyi for keyi using AIKi
with the certifykey functionality of TPM. Stores tuple (certkeyi , keyi, secret)
and returns (pubkeyi , certkeyi , sid) to Pi.
Load Key: When receiving a message (loadkey, sid, keyi, secret) from some
sub party P of Pi, TPMi returns keyhandlei which refers to internally loaded
private key keyi into TPMi. Next, stores a tuple (keyhandlei, keyi, sid, i) and
returns (keyhandlei, sid) to Pi.
Get public key: When receiving a message (getkey, sid, certkeyj , j) from
some sub party P . If there exists a stored tuples (sid, j, AIKj, certAIKj) and
(certkeyj , keyj) then it gets both keyj and certAIKj and sends the public key
tuple (keyj, certAIKj) to P. Before delivering the tuple with key, ask the ad-
versary (non-immediate delivery).
Signature Generation: Upon receiving a message (sign, sid,m, keyhandlei)
from some subparty P of Pi, if there exists a stored tuple
(keyhandlei, keyi, sid, i), then generate a signature σ using keyi, store
the tuple(i,m, σ, keyi) and send (signature, sid,m, σ) to Pi.
Signature Verication: Upon receiving a message
(verify, sid, Pi,m, σ, keyi) from Pj do: If a tuple (i,m, σ, keyi) is stored
set f = 1 else set f = 0. Sends (verified, sid,m, f) to Pj.
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Functionality FTTPM
Part III
Unload Key: Upon receiving a message (unload, sid, keyhandlei)
from subparty P (where P is a subparty of Pi or P = S), if
there exists tuple (keyhandlei, keyi, sid, i), then discard the stored tuple
(keyhandlei, keyi, sid, i).
As the functionalities of ideal functionality FTTPM include generating signatures,
we list denitions of some signatures generated by FTTPM and some related notations
which are used in the rest of this work below.
Denition II.4. Signatures by Trusted Platform Modules
(1) tN : Signature generated by FTTPM functionality of verier V 's TPM using its
signing key keyV on a random string N where tN ∈ {0, 1}s(k).
(2) tw: Signature generated by FTTPM functionality of prover P 's TPM using its
signing key keyV on a witness w where tw ∈ {0, 1}s(k).
(3) tR: An arbitrary string generated by a party with length same as the signature
generated by FTTPM where tR ∈ {0, 1}
s(k).
Protocol TPM-ZKR
Besides using a TPM as a catalyst, we use witness indistinguishable arguments
(WIAOK) in a way similar to the protocol of introduced in Hofheinz et al.[18] for the
protocol TPM-ZKR. The participants of TPM-ZKR are prover P , verier V , real
27
adversary A, simulator S and environment Z. TPM-ZKR implements functionality
FRZK using FTTPM as catalyst, where all communication is done through a secure
channel that only leaks the length of the messages, and the environment may access
the functionality FTTPM through parties other than P and V . At the beginning of the
protocol TPM-ZKR, P knows (x,w) such that xRw.
(1) When receiving an input (prove, sid, x, w), where x is the common input for R
such that xRw, the prover P sends x to V .
(2) V creates a signing key keyV by sending (creataik, sid, secret) to FTTPM and
loads keyV by sending (loadkey, sid, keyi, secret) to FTTPM functionality. If it
cannot load the keyV , it terminates.
(3) V generates a random nonce N of k bits and sends tuple (N, certkeyV ) to P via
a secure channel.
(4) P gets the public key tuple of V using get key functionality of FTTPM functional-
ity. Then, P creates a signing key keyP and loads keyP into its TPMP using cre-
ate key and load key fuctionalities of FRTPM functionality respectively. If it can-
not load the keyP , it terminates. P signs w by sending (sign, sid,m, keyhandlei)
to FTTPM , and unloads its key keyP using the unload key functionality of FTTPM .
Then it proves to the verier that there exists a triple (w, tw, tN), such that
verifykeyP (1k, tw, w)∨xRw∨verifykeyV (1k, tN , N) using a witness indistinguish-
able argument of knowledge (WIAOK). Along with WIAOK, P sends certkeyP
to V .
(5) If the verier accepts the arguments of knowledge, it terminates with output
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(proven, sid, x). Additionally, it unloads its key in any case.
Theorem II.5. If T is an existentially unforgeable signature scheme, then protocol
TPM-ZKR using the functionality FTTPM securely implements the functionalities FRZK
and FTTPM with respect to static adversaries. Here FTTPM is used as a catalyst.
Proof. The participants of protocol TPM-ZKR are environment Z, prover P , verier
V , real adversaries A and ideal adversary S. In order to prove the security, we
consider two scenarios of protocol TPM-ZKR, where prover P is corrupted in one
scenario and verier V is corrupted in other. In each scenario, we consider two
settings: one in which the real protocol is run with real parties, and another with a
simulator S interacting with ideal functionality FRZK . At the nish of either setting of
each scenario, the environment provides an output Z(ensemble), which is a random
variable (i.e., the output of Z on input ensemble).
Case 1: Corrupted Verier
Two settings are as follows
Real Adversary A
The protocol TPM-ZKR will be modied, where A stands in for V in TPM-
ZKR. In step 3, A will generate nonce N of k bits and send it to P . At step 4,
adversary A will be responding to the prover P 's WIAOK and delivers the output
to the environment Z. After step 3 of TPM-ZKR, both parties will have same input
I = 〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k) × {0, 1}k. The witness triple known to P will be WA =
(w, tw, tR), and the honest prover P will generate a WIAOK for verifykeyP (1
k, tw,w)∧
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xRw∨verifykeyV (1
k, tR, N). The ensemble generated by A, on interaction with honest
P with witness WA on common input I is {〈P (WA),A〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k .
Ideal adversary S
S simulates the static adversary A with real parties, i.e., with honest prover P and
corrupted verier V . When FRZK receives (prove,sid,x,w) from party P , and if xRw,
then FRZK sends (prove,sid, x ) to S. As soon as S receives (prove, sid, x) it initializes
V 's FTTPM functionality, uses FTTPM to generate a key keyj and simulates protocol
TPM-ZKR with adversary A. The real protocol TPM-ZKR will be modied from
step 3 where A stands in for corrupted V . A produces nonce N and sends to S. S
sendsN to V 's FTTPM and receives tN from V 's FTTPM . Next, S sets up a WIAOK using
common input is I = 〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k)×{0, 1}k and witness triple WS = (r, tR, tN),
and the WIAOK will argue that verifykeyP (1
k, tR, r)∧xRw∨verifykeyV (1
k, tN , N). The
ensemble generated by S in this case will be {〈S(WS),S〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k
In two settings, real and ideal, the behavior seen by the environment Z is identical
through step 3 of TPM-ZKR. The only dierence is in the WIAOK in steps 4 and
step 5, so in eect the environment Z acts as a polynomial-time distinguisher for the
real and ideal settings. If Z can distinguish between the real world adversary A and
ideal adversary S with non negligible probability 1
p(k)
, then the above construction
acts as a distinguisher for the WIAOK witnesses WA and WS with non-negligible
probability, violating our assumption of secure WIAOK. Therefore, it follows for any
polynomial p(k) and all suciently large k and it holds
Pr[Z(I, 〈P (WA),A〉(I)) = 1]− Pr[Z(I, 〈P (WS),S〉(I)) = 1] < 1p(k)
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Case 2: Corrupted Prover
In both settings, honest V will be participating in TPM-ZKR. The two settings
are:
Real Adversary A
As P is corrupted, A stands in for corrupted P which leads to the modication of
TPM-ZKR. Step 1 of TPM-ZKR will be modied, where A sends x ∈ {0, 1}m(k) to
honest V . In step 4, A will prove to the verier that there exists a triple (w, tw, tR)
such that verifykeyP (1
k, tw,w) ∧ xRw ∨ verifykeyV (1
k, tR, N) using a WIAOK. After
step 3 of modied protocol TPM-ZKR, both parties A and honest V will have the
same input I = 〈x, N〉 ∈ {0, 1}m(k) × {0, 1}k. The witness triple in this case is
WA = (w, tw, tR) and WIAOK is verifykeyP (1
k, tw,w) ∧ xRw ∨ verifykeyV (1
k, tR, N).
The ensemble generated by honest V , on interaction with corrupted P with witness
WA on common input I is {〈A(WA), V 〉(I)}I∈{0,1}m(k)×{0,1}k .
Ideal Adversary S
As prover P is corrupted, simulator S simulates TPM-ZKR with static adversary
A and real parties, i.e., corrupted prover P and honest verier V . As a part of
simulation of the real protocol TPM-ZKR with static adversary A, step 1 of TPM-
ZKR will be modied because A stands in for corrupted P . In step 1, A will send
x ∈ {0, 1}m(k) to honest verier V . In step 4, S initialize corrupted P 's FTTPM and A
sends w to S to get tw. Since TPM is a catalyst, A may send many other values to
S (which controls the P 's TPM) for signatures of those values. In order to capture
w, S tests every value from A to nd one which satises xRw, and then stores
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both w and sw. After generating tw, S delivers tw to A and unload keyP from
P 's TPM. In the ideal world, S acts as corrupted P and sends (prove, sid, x, w)
to ideal functionality FRZK . If xRw, then FRZK sends (prove, sid, x) to S. Another
modication for step 4 is A will prove to the honest verier V of FRZK that there
exists a triple (w, tw, tR) such that verifypkp(1
k, sw,w)∧xRw∨verifypkv(1k, sR, N) using
a WIAOK. Depending on real honest verier V 's output at step 5, the simulator S
either allows or does not allow the ideal functionality FRZK to send (proven,sid,x ) to
ideal party V . Since simulator S simulates the complete modied protocol TPM-
ZKR with static adversary A, the ensemble generated by the real honest verier
is verifykeyP (1
k, tw,w) ∧ xRw ∨ verifykeyV (1
k, tR, N), where I is the common input.
Finally, the environment Z cannot distinguish with which adversary it is interacting
because in both scenarios the honest verier produces indistinguishable ensembles.
Therefore, from both cases we have shown that protocol TPM-ZKR using the func-
tionality FTTPM securely implements the functionalities FRZK and FTTPM with respect
to static adversaries.
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CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The idea of using actual secure hardware in designing universally composable cryp-
tographic protocols, pursued by Hofheinz et al. [18], is an important breakthrough in
designing realistic two party protocols in universal composable framework. Hofheinz
et al. use government issued signature cards as catalysts to support universally com-
posable zero knowledge and commitments protocols. The ideal functionality which
is securely realized by zero-knowledge protocol of Hofheinz et al. is not the stan-
dard denition. Therefore, in this thesis we returned to the traditional denition of
the ideal functionality using a generic witness relation, which reects the Canneti's
ideal functionality [3]. While providing a brief sketch, Hofheinz et al. did not give
a complete security proof for the universally composable zero-knowledge proofs from
signature cards. As one contribution of this thesis, we present a complete security
proof for this universally composable zero-knowledge protocol, using signature cards
and based on a generic witness relation.
Some of the drawbacks of relying on these government issued signature cards of
Hofheinz et al. [18] are:
(1) Although, signature cards are tamper evident, they are not widespread.
(2) The parties in the protocol must completely trust the producer or issuer of the
signature cards. If the issuer is corrupted, then whole setting will be meaning-
less.
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(3) Since the signature cards are government issued, in a scenario in which parties
from dierent countries participate in a protocol, the system using signature
cards may become more complex or impractical.
These drawbacks can be mitigated or completely eliminated by using Trusted Plat-
form Modules (TPMs), tamper-evident chips designed to be embedded in computer
systems. Trusted Platform Modules are widely spread and are attached to the moth-
erboard of almost every business laptops or desktops currently produced. Since they
are widespread, it gives us exibility to design realistic universally composable multi-
party protocols using Trusted Platform Modules. In this thesis, we give a detailed
denition of ideal functionality of a TPM-based catalyst, and present a universally
composable zero knowledge protocol using Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs). We
also provide a complete security proof for our universally composable zero knowledge
protocol using a TPM-based catalyst.
There are several possible future directions to extend this work. First, our pro-
posed TPM-assisted universally composable zero knowledge protocol creates a new
signing key for every instance of its execution. Since a TPM is a relatively slow
device, creating a key is a costly operation. Improvements should be made in the
design of protocol to address this issue eectively. Additionally, in the current work
we require every party have a TPM, but the TPMs of the two parties play dierent
roles. Therefore, another direction is to consider whether a secure protocol can be
designed with a TPM required by only one party of the protocol.
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